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effectually dispose of the case. They clearly support the defendants Gaius Munger and Celia Munger's claim to the property of a
homestead, and decide, that as against the assignee, who took in
hostility to their deed, they are not estopped by it; but as against
him they can maintain their exemptions, and also, that the decree
against Isadore does .not affect them, and that the assignee does
not derive any new title as against them therefrom.
Such being the rights of the parties as against the assignee in
bankruptcy, the plaintiff who purchased of the assignee, and with
full knowledge of the condition of the estate, and claims of Gains
Munger, occupies no better position than the assignee. By the
deed he succeeded tothe rights of the assignee only; and, as I
have determined that the defendants are entitled to their homestead exemption ,as against the assignee, the title of the plaintiff
to this property, it being their homestead, has failed, and the plaintiff has failed therefore to show title to the property in controversy.
I therefore find- that the plaintiff is not the owner of the
premises described in the complaint, nor is he entitled to the posSession thereof; and direct judgment in favor of the defendants,
with costs.
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ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

Action on Award-Amendment-Evidence.-n an action npon an
award made by H1. ind S.. two of the three arbitrators to whom, or a
majority of them. the parties had submitted "all controversies and
matters of difference existing between them of every kind and nature
whatsoever," the answer was, (1) th.t the only matter of difference
between the parties at the time of such submission was connected with
From J. W. WallAce, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 19 of his Reports.
2 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in.74 Pennsylvania State Rep.
3 From J. W. Rowell, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 46 Vermont Reports.
4 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 34 Wisconsin Reports.
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an action by plaintiff against defendant for an alleged assault, &c., and
that the arbitrators heard evidence concerning other matters, not in
controversy bctween the parties, and considered the same in making
their award; and (2) that before the award was made, the arbitrators
mutually agreed to resign, and did resign, their authority as such, and
that afterwards II. and S. made the award without notice to or the
knowledge or consent of G., the third arbitrator. Defendant was permitted to amend the answer by inserting a statement of the particular
circumstances of the alleged assault, &c. Held, that the order allowing
'such awendiuent was within the discretion of the court, and did not
involve the merits nor necessarily affect the judgment, and cannot be
reviewed on appeal from the judgment (Tay. Stats. 1632, § 6), and was
probably not itself appealable: Hc Cord v. Mckpaden, 84 Wis.
Evidence having been admitted for the plaintiff which tended to show
that on the day when G. withdrew from the arbitration, defendant
recognised the board of arbitiation as still in existence and'competent,
to wake an award, it was not error to admit evidence for defendant, to
show that at the time of such recognition he had not, been informed of
G.'s withdrawal: Id.
It was not error to permit defendant, as a witness for himself in this
action, to state the nature of the difference between himself and plaintiff "as detailed by the witnesses before the arbitrators,"for the purpossonly of showing that the arbitrators acted upon matters not submittedto them, the court at the same time ruling that defendant could not in,
this action "go into the merits of the controversy" submitted to arbitration : Id.
Where an issue of fact, not raised by the pleadings, was distinctlysubmitted to the jury without objection, the admission of any properevidence of such fact (not objected to on the ground that the issue was
not made by the pleadings, but only upon other grounds) cannot betreated as error. In such a case the pleadings may be amended (if
necessary) to conform t0 the facts proved : Id.
Where the question was, whether either of the acting arbitrators wos.
guilty of any misconduct or unfairness which invalidated the award, a
witness, being requested to state what facts he knew, answered-that
"when defendant made a statement that appeared to bear hard on plaintiff, S. would ask a question in order to lighten it up a little, and when,
it bore on defendant's side, S. tried to do away with" it." Hed, that
this was a statement of an alleged fact, having a direct bearing on thequestion at issue, and the court did not err in refusing to strike it out::
Id.
ATTORNEY.
See Fvidence.
Contempt of Court-Disbarrin-Mandamus.-TheAct of Con-.
gress of March 2d 1831, entitled "An act. declaratory of the' law concerning contempts of court," limits the power of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States to three classes of cases: 1st, where:
there has been misbehavior of a person in the presence of the courts,.
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; 2d, where.
there has been misbehavior of any officer of the courts im his offoiai
transactions; and 3d, where there has been disobedience.or resistane,by any officer, party, juror, witness or other person, to any lawful wrk
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process, order, rule, decree or command of the courts: Eparte Robin-

son, 19 Wall.
The seventeenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, in proscribing
fine or imprisonment as the punishment which may be inflicted by the
courts of the United States for contempts, operates as a limitation upon
the manner in which their power in this respect may be exercised, and
is a negation of all other modes of punishment: Id.
The power to disbar an attorney can only be exercised where there
has been such conduct on the part of the party complained of as shows
him to be unfit to be a member of the profession ; and before judgment
disbarring him can be rendered he should have notice of the groun ds
of complaint against him and ample opportunity of explanation and
defence : Id.
Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to restore an attorney disbarred,
where the court below has exceeded its jurisdiction in the matter: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.

ConditionalPromise-Reasonable Time.-A paper promising to pay
with interest, a sum of money specified and acknowledged to be due,
"as soon as the crop can be sold or the money raised from any other
source," is not in either form or effect a promissory note: Nunez v.
Dautel, 19 Wall.
It is a promise to pay the money specified upon the occurrence of
either of the events named in the paper, oRuafter the lapse of a reasonable amount of time within which to procure, in one mode or in the
other, the means necessary to meet the liability : Id.
It does not mean that if the crop should be destroyed or could never
be sold, and the parties promising could not procure the money from
any other source, the debt should never be paid : Id.
The question of what was a reasonable time (there being no evidence in
the case but the written promise itself), was a question for the court: Id.
Five years and more is much more than a reasonable time: Id.
Negotiabilty-Conlitional Tlme for Payment.-A note "Twelve
months after date (or before if made out of the sale of a machine)"
I promise to pay to J. F. Huston or bearer," &c. Held to be negotiable: Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Pa.
A note to be negotiable must be for the payment of money at a fixed
period or an event which must inevitably happen; it is not negotiable if
its payment depends upon a contingency, although that may in fact
-happen: Id.
A note may be negotiable if payable certainly at a fixed time. although
subject to a contingency under which it may become due earlier : Id.
BOUNDARY.
CONFEDERATE NOTES.

See Deed.

See Removal of Causes.

Meaning of word Dollars.-Notesissued by the Confederate government having become the currency in which contracts were made and
'usiness conducted in the insurrectionary states, during the recent civil
-war, and such notes having been designated by general custom as notes
for so many "dollars," parol evidence is admissible, where suit is
brought . . . to enforce a contract payable in "dollars," and made
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during the war, to prove-the above condition of things being first
shown-that the term " dollars" as used in the contract meant, in fact,
Confederate notes. In the absence of such evidence the presumption
of law would be that by the term "dollars," the lawful currency of the
United States was intended. Thornton v. Smith, 8 Wallace 1, explained:
The Confederate Note Case, 19 Wall.
The ordinance of North Carolina of 1865 declared that all existing
contracts solvable in money, whether under seal or not, made after the
depreciation of Confederate currency, before the first day of Mlay 1865,
and then unf'ulfilled (except official bonds, and penal bonds payable to
the state), should "be deemed to have been made with the understanding that they were solvable in money of the value of the said currency ;"
but at the same time provided that it should be "competent for either
of the parties to show, by parol or other relevant testimony, what the
understanding was in regard to the kind of currency in which the same
were solvable," and that in such case "the true understanding," should
regulate the value of the contract. Held, That the understanding of the
parties might be shown from the nature of the transaction, and the
attendant circumstances, as satisfactorily as from the language used;
and particularly that it might be shown from the length of time during
which the contracts had to run before maturing; and that accordingly
when bonds of a railroad company were issued in May'1862, payable
at dates varying from seven to thirteen years afterwards, the inference
was justified that the company intended at the time of issuing them,
that the bonds should be paid in lawful money instead of Confederate
notes : Ild.
The interest payable on a bond, issued as above mentioned, follows
the character of the principal, and is payable in like currency: Id.
Usury as a defence, must be especially pleaded or set up in the answer
to entitle it to consideration : Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See Municipal Corporations.
Tonnage Taz -A state cannot, in order to defray the expenses of
her quarantine regulations, impose a tonnage tax on vessels owned in
foreign ports, and entering her harbors in pursuit of commerce: Peete
v. Morgan, 19 Wall.
Contract-ImpairingObligationof.-Where in a university of learning, belonging to the state, and which the state was in the habit of
governing through curators appointed by itself (such as the University
of Mlissouri), a person was appointed by the curators a professor and
librarian, for six years from the date of his appointment, "subject to
law," held that the legislature could vacate his office, appoint new curators, and without fauult on the part of the professor assigned, order anew
election of a professor to the same professorship, and of a librarian, before
the expiration of the six years: Head v. The University, 19 Wall.

Commerce between two States-Private Contracts.-The Act of Congress of June 15th 1866, authorizing every railroad company in the
United States, whose road was operated by steam, and its successors and
assigns, to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges and ferries all
passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight and property, on
their way from one state to another state, and to receive compensation
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therefor, and to connect with roads of other states so far as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to their place of destination; and the Act of July 25th 1866, authorizing the construction
of certain bridges over the Mississippi river, and among others a bridge
connecting Dubuque with Dunleith, in the state of Illinois, and providing that the bridges, when constructed, should be free fIr the crossing
of all trains of railroads terminating on either side of the river, fo"
reasonable compensation, were designed to remove trammels upon transportation between different states, interposed by state enactments or
by existing laws of Congress, and were not intended to interfere with
private contracts and annul such as had been made on the basis of existing legislation and existing means of interstate communication : Railroad Company v. Richmond et al., 19 Wall.
Contracts valid when made, continue valid, and capable of enforcement, so long as peace lasts between the governments of the contracting
parties, notwithstanding a change in the conditions of business which
originally led to their creation : Id,
The power to regulate commerce among the several states was vested
in Congress in order to secure equality and freedom in commercial intercourse against discriminating state legislation ; it was not intended that
the power should be exercised so as to interfere with private contracts
not designed at the time they were made to !create impediments to such
intercourse : .d.
Accordingly, a contract between a railroad company and an elevator
company, that the latter company, in consideration of erecting and using
for that purpose an elevator, should have for a prescribed term the
handling, at a stipulated price, of all grain brought by the railroad
company in its cars to the city of Dubuque, on the Mississippi river, to
be transmitted to a place beyond, did not cease to be valid and binding
upon the parties because afterwards, by the construction of a railroad
bridge across the Mississippi at Dubuque it became unnecessary for the
railroad company or its lessee, and a useless expense to it. to have the
grain- brought by it to Dubuque handled at that place. The enforcement of the contract after the construction of the bridge was not an
interference with the power of Congress to regulate commerce between
the states : Id.
CORPORATION.
See Taxation.
DAMAGES.

See Negligence; Stamp;

sury.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Trustee Process-Liabilityof PartnershipDemandfor the Sole Debt
of one of the F'rm.-:-The defendant contracted in his own name with
the trustee, to build a bridge for the trustee. W. was in fact partner
with the defendant in the transaction, but the trustee had no knowledge
of it. The defendant and W. both worked on the job. Held, that the
-trustee was not chargeable for any part of the contract price, in a suit
against the defendant alone for his sole indebtedness: Bartlettv. Woodward, 46 Vt.
DEED.

Constructionof- When Monuments wilt govern Courses and Distances
-Parol Evidence.-The description contained in the plaintiff's deed of
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the locus hn quo, after giving three courses, and coming to a road upon
the east line of the plaintiff's land, continued as follows: "Thence N.
17' E., 8 rods. and 17 links, on the west side of said road; thence N.
290 E., 6 rods and 18 links; thence N. 9 rods; thence N. 38P0 E., 18
rods; thence N. 60J' E., 4 rods and 10 links; thence A. 4610 E., 7
rods and 17 links to the corner near the house formerly owned by Jt.
Oaslello." The courses and distances above given constituted the east
line of the locus in quo. The defendants claimed that there was a mistake in the fifth course given in the deed-that it should have been N.
29' W., instead of N. 290 -and gave evidence tending to show that
*aline run with such corrected course, would strike the shed at said
house; whereas a line run upon the courses named in the deed, ended
two or three rods north-east of said house. The plaintiff testified that
he never claimed to own east of said road, and that he always claimed
the corner at or near said house, to be his north-east corner. But, in
following the courses mentioned in the deed, it appeared that some portion ofsaid road, and in some places land east thereof, were included in
the descriptim in said deed. The court charged the jury that, notwithstanding the evidence as to the extent of thd plaintiff's claim in regard
to the location of his east line, he would be entitled to hold so far as the
courses and distances given in the deed, carried him, and that the courses
and distances as given in the deed, controlled his right., and if by following them, some part or all of the road was conveyed, he could recover
for trespasses committed thereon, unless barred by a license claim by
the defendants. Held, no error: Barley v. Morrill, 46 Vt.
In order for an application of the rule, that monuments govern Gourses
and distances, the location of the monuments must be proved; and parol
evidence is admissible for that purpose. If no monuments are mentioned
in the deed. or if mentioned, their existence and location are not proved,
courses and distances will govern : Id.
In the construction of a deed, in order to warrant the court in assuming
a mistake in the course of a line, and substituting another, the deed
itself, or the deed with proof of such facts as are competent to be shown
in aid of the construction of a written instrument, must contain the
necessary elements to make such assumption a matter of legal construction of the deed, as contradistinguished from matter of extrinsic
proof: Id.
DIVIDEND. See Taxation.
EVIDENCE.

See Arbitration; Negligence; Trespass.

Judicial Notice.-This court does not take judicial notice of the
various orders issued by a military commander in the exercise of the
military authority conferred upon him : Burke v. Miltenberger, 19 Wall.
Privileged 6omrmunicaton-Principaland Agent.-n order to make
communications to counsel privileged, they must be made to them confidentially, as counsel; the relation of attorney and client must exist at
the time; and the communication must be made for the purpose of
obtaining advice in regard to legal rights. A general retainer in the
matter as to which advice is sought, is not necessary; but the attorney
must be counsel in that matter, and the communication made to him as
such : Earle v. Grout, 46 Vt.
The facts that make communications privileged, must be proved, and
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the burden lies on him who seeks to exclude them as evidence because
they are privileged : -d.
The declarations of an agent are admissible against his principal,
if made in the execution of his agency; but not, if made afterwards:
Id.
EQUITY. See Fraud; Vendor and Purchaser.
EXECUTIVE OFFICES.
FORMER ACTION.

See Statute.

See Negligence.

Judgment-Cause of Action.-The defendant recovered judgment
by default against the plaintiffs for the use of his horse while it was
being kept by them. The plaintiffs subsequently sought, in this action,
to recover of the defeudant for the keeping of the horse. Held, that
the defendant's just claim in his suit against the plaintiffs, was for the
use of the horse, they keeping it, and that, nothing appearing to the
contrary, the presumption was that the damages in that suit were assessed
upon that basis; consequently, that that adjudication included and
merged the plaintiff's claim for keeping said horse: Bemis v. Jennings,
46 Vt.
FRAUD.
Deed obtained by Fraud-Controlof a Court of Equity.-Where
land of an intestate had been sold and conveyed to A. by the administrator without authority of law, so that the title remained in the heir,
and B. obtained a conveyance from the heir for a nominal consideration,
by fraudulently representing that he was procuring it for the benefit of
A., and to cure the defects in his title: Held, (1.) That the legal title
.passedby such conveyance from the heir to B. (2.) That A., or one
claiming under him, had an equitable interest in~the land by reason of
such fraud : Lombard v. Cowham, 34 Wis.
If the deed to B. were void by reason of such fraud, that would be a
legal defence to an action of ejectment by B. against A.'s grantee, and
the question of fraud would be one for the jury, under a general denial
in the answer: Id.
But such deed not being void in law, defendant cannot avail himself
of the fraud as a defence at law under a general denial, but must set it
up by counter-claim as a ground of positive relief in equity; and the
issue thus made must be determined by the court : Id.
Where, therefore, the court admitted evidence of the alleged fraud
under a general denial, and instructed the jury that if plaintiff's deed
was procured by such fraud it was void, and he had no title, a judgment
upon a verdict in defendant's favor must be reversed: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
HIGHWAY.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Sale.

See Negligence.
See Negligence; Usury.

INSURANCE.

Alienation of Property Insured-Sale by Judicial Process.-Real
estate of a decedent, the buildings on which iwere insured, was sold at
Orphans' Court sale; before its confirmation the buildings were burned;
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ifeh,, that the sale was not such alienation as to avoid the policy: The

Farmers' Mat Ins. Co. v. Graybill,74 Pa.
The suit on the policy was properly brought in the name of the administrator to the use of the vendee; who had sufficient interest to give
notice of the loss: Rd.
Islirnce-Sltcide-Insanity.-nan action on a life policy, the assured having taken his own life, and the allegation being that he was
insane, the court charged : " If the assured was not conscious of the
act he was committing, but acted under an insane impulse or delusion
sufficient to impair his understanding or will, or if his reasoning was so
far overthrown by his mental condition that he was incapable of exercising his judgment in regard to the consequences, the defendants are
liable. Held not to be error : American Life Ins. Co. v. sett's Adm.,
74 Pa.
A point was: "If F. B. Isett, at the time of his death, was conscious
that his death would follow the discharging of the pistol in his own
hands, there can be no recovery, although he was laboring under mental
depression or disturbance of the mind." The court below negatived
the point. Hdd not to be error: Id.
JUDGMENT.

Power of Court over-Cl.ricalError.-Except as authorized by the
statute (R. S. ch. 125, see. 38), the court, in cases tried by it, cannot,
upon motion, vacate ajudment after the term at which it was entered,
for errors in law or fact committed in rendering it, or occurring before
it was pronounced. .XEtna Life Ins. Co. v. McCormick (20 Wis. 565),
and other cases in this court: Scheer and Wife v. Keown, 34 Wis.
Per DixoN, C. J. This'rule, while it forbids in all cases the vacating
of a judgment at a subsequent term for the purpose of grantiny a new
trial,does not forbid:
(1.) The setting aside of an 6rder or judgment at the same term at
which it was rendered:
(2.) The vacation or amendmentof a judgment so as to correct errors
or mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court, and make the record conform to the judgment actually pronounced, or the entry such as
should have been made when the judgment was rendered:
(3.) The vacation, at a subsequent term, of a void judgment, or of
judgments entered on coynovit or confession, over which courts exercise,
on motion, a supervisory, equitable jurisdiction :
(4.) An order vacating a judgment, directing it to be satsfied, or.
staying proceedings upon it, to inquire into facts occurring after it was
rendered, or after the time when the party could avail himself of them
in the action, and which show that such judgment, or a part of it, ought
not to be enforced against the party making the application : Id.
LIBEL.
MONEY.

See Tort.

See Confederate Notes.
MORTGAGE.

Fraudulent Representations-1nnocent Holders.-A farmer and his
wife on the line of a proposed country railroad, subscribed to stock in
the road and mortgaged their farm, upon representations made to them
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by agents of the road and others, in time of excitement got up at public
meetings, that tile road would prove a most lucrative investment of
money, a very profitable thing to the neighborhood, and would enable
farmers to sell the products of their farm at a large advance over existing prices. Tie making of the road was begun, and after a good deal
of money had been laid out in grading,:&c., the further making of
it was absolutely stopped fbr want of funds, and it remained unmade.
The iniortgage thus got was assigned to a director of the road who was
a large creditor of the road (then much embarrassed for money). when
the mortgage was given. Held, on a bill !by him to foreclose, that he
was ti) be taken as an innocent holder for value ; and that on the distinction recognised by the law between a representation of existing facts,
and a representation of facts yet to come into existence-the distinction
between "promissory statements" based upon general knowledge, information, and judgment, and those representations which, from knowledge peculiarly his own, a party may certainly know will prove to be
true or thlse- he was entitled.to a decree : Sawyer v. 1'rickett and JRfe,
19 Wall.
IuNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See Negligence.

Tking Propertyfor Street-Notice to Owner- WaTiver.-Under that
provision of the Constitution of tkis State (art. XI., sec. 2), which declares that " no municipal corporation shall take private property for
public use against the consent of the owner, without the necessity
thereof being established by the verdict of a jury," the proceeding to
determine such necessity is adversary (Lumsden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis.
485), and no step in its nature final is valid if taken without notice to
the owner of the property: Se.fert v. Brooks, 34 Wis.'
A village charter (P. & L. L]aws of 18'71, ch. 381) attempts to regulate the proceeding to determine whether land sought to be condemned
for a street in said village is necessary for that purpose (sees. 38-40),
but makes no provision for notfying the iowner of the time and place
for the assembling of the jury. field, that this omission renders the
act, as to this subject, unconstitutional,and the proceedings taken under
it wholly void: Id.
Whether the omission to provide for notice to the property-owner of
the time and place appointed for the selection of the jury would have the
same effect, is not here decided: Id.
The provision of said act which requires the jury to hear the declarations of the parties interested for or against the laying out of the
street, does not relieve the objection that no notice to the party is provided for: Id.
Where the act is void for failing to provide for notice, the facts that
the property-owner has been notified of the time and place of meeting
of the jury, and that he is actuallypresent at such meeting, but without
taking any part, do not give the proceeding validity; nothing being
4done by him which constitutes a waiver of his rights: Id.
The landowner in such a case objectedito the damages offered him by
the village trustees on laying out the streets, and thereupon a jury was
summoned pursuant to said charter, who assessed the damages, but it
does not appear that the landowner accepted them.
ield, that he is
not estopped by these facts from denying the validity of the proceedings
to determine the necessity of taking his land : Id.
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NATIONAL BANKS.

Stock is PersonalProperty-Taxation of.-Shares of stock in the
national banks are personal property, and though they are a species of
personal property which, in one sense, is intangible and incorporeal, the
law which created them could separate them from the person of their
owner for the purpose of taxation, and give them a situs of their own:
Tap,;an, Collector, v. Merchants' Nvitional Bank, 19 Wall.
The forty-first section of the National Banking Act of June 3d
1864-which in effect provided that all shares in such banks, held
by any person or body corporate, may be included in the valuation of
the personal property of such person or corporation in the asgessment
of taxes imposed under state authority, at the place where the bank is
located, and not elsewhere-did this : Id.
This provision of the National Banking Act became a law of the
property, and every state within which a national bank was afterwards
located acquired jurisdiction, for the purposes of taxation, of all the
shareholders of the bank, both resident and non-resident, and of all its
shares, and power to legislate accordingly: Id.
Nothing in Article IX. in the Constitution of Illinois of 1848, which
was still existing in 1867, prevented the legislature of the state from
providing for the taxation of the owners of shares of the capital stock
of a national bank in that state, at the place, within the state, where
the bank was located, without regard to their places of residence: 'I.
The act of the said legislature, passed June 13th 1867, so providing,
was valid under the said constitution : Id.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Stamp; Trespass.

FormerAction-Damages-EVidence.-Husbandand wife having recovered final judgment in 'a joint action against defendant town, for personal injuries to the wife, occasioned by reason of the insufficiency of a
highway in said town, the defendant is estopped, in an action by the
husband to recover damages for the loss of the wife's service and for the
expense of medical attendance, to deny facts put in issue and found
against it in the former action: Lindsey v. Town, of Danville, 46 Vt.
The ground of recovery is loss of service, and if the jury think that
the sum paid for necessary labor substituted for the ordinary service of
the wife, with interest thereon, is the measure of a just compensation
for -the.loss of the wife's service, they are at liberty to find damages to
that amount; and a charge to that effect is no error. Whether interest,
eo eomine, is recoverable in an action of tort or not, a jury may consider
time, in fixing upon reasonable damages: Id.
Evidence offered by the plaintiff to fix such sum, may be properly
admitted; and evidence .sought to be introduced by the defendant,
tending to show that the wife was in ill health at some uncertain time
prior to said injury, may be properly excluded: d.
Eridence-Hiyhway-Damayes.-A witness who had examined the
place of accident on a highway, and made some measurements of the
width of the road at that and other points, with a rod, after having testified to the width of the road, and the width of the different kinds of
carriages in use on highways, was allowed to testify that, in his opinion,
the road was not wide enough at the place of accident for two teamwagons to pass each other. Held, no error: Fulsome v. Town-of Concord, 46 Vt.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

The defendant requested the court to charge, that if a load of hay,
which, it appeared, stood in the highway at the time and place of accident, was au obstruction in the highway, and was the primary cause of
the accident, the plaintiff could not recover, unless the town authorities
knew of' such obstruction, or ought to have known it, and had had a
reasonable time to remove the same. The court refused to charge as requested; but charged, that notwithstanding the jury found that the
oad of hay was an obstruction, for which the town was in no way liable,
and that the accident would not have happened if the hay had not been
in the road, still if they found that the! highway was insufficient by
reason of bein. too narrow, or for want of a railing or muniment, and
that such insufficiency contributed to the happening of the accident,
-or, if the road had been sufficient in said particulars, that the accident would not have happened, notwithstanding the hay,-the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover, if in other respects his case was made out.
Hehl, no error: Id.
The defendant requested the court to charge the jury not to allow any
feeling of sympathy for the plaintiff to influence themn in deciding the
case. The cour. charged the jury that they would remember to lay
aside their feelings in the case, but said to them, "Of course none of
us can do away, entirelywith our sympatlies; we all have more or less
feeling of sympathy for a party who has been injured, and it is right we
should; but, in making up your verdict in the case, you will lay aside
your feelings of sympathy, as far as may be, and determine the issues
in the case upon the evidence given in court, forgetting, as far as may
be, the parties, and the consequences of your determination." Held, no
substantial error, but that it would have been more satisfactory, had the
judge been more decided and explicit in instructing the jury that their
sympathy for the plaintiff should have nothing to do with their verdict:

Id.
The court charged the jury in respect to prospective damages, that
they should reduce the losses which the plaintiff would thereafter suffer
from loss of time, doctoring, and personal suffering, to their present
worth, or to such a sum as, being put at interest, would amount to the
sum they found the plaihtiff would lose in the future by reason of the
injury. Held, no error: Il.

Municipal Corporation-Sppery Pavement.-In an action for an
injury to plaintiff's person alleged to have been caused by the defective
condition of a public walk in the defendant city, it appeared that plaintiff, on his way to a railroad depot, passed westward along the south side
of a certain street until he reached a bridge connecting the east and
west portions of said street ; that after crossing the bridge, he passed
over to the north side of said street, and, in descending frnm the bridge
-to the sidewalk, along a plank walk which descended about two and a
half feet in twenty, he fell and was injured; that it was a bright starlight evening in winter, with snow upon the ground; that plaintiff had
in one hand a satchel and in the other books; that there were strips
nailed across said descending walk, but these were entirely covered with
packed snow and ice, and the whole surface of the walk was smooth and
slippery. It also appeared that plaintiff had been on the walk frequently, and knew that it was an inclined plane at this point; but there
was no evidence that he knew of its peculiarly slippery and dangerous
condition at that time. It was one of the principal walks of the city,
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over which hundreds of persons were daily passing. There was a less
descent from the bridge to the sidewalk on the south side of the street;
and the middle of the street was planked. Hel,, that upon these facts
the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury, as a propusition of
law, that plaintiff was guilty of negligence in descending upon this
walk to the north side of the street; but that question was properly
left to the jury: Perkins v. The 0ity of Fond (itu Lac, 34 Wis.
The mere slippery condition of a sidewalk, arising from the ordinary
action of the elements (as snow and ice), is not a defect which renders
the town or city liable under the statute (Cook v. Mfilwaukee. 24 Wis.
270, and 27 Id. 191) ; but if the walk is in other respects unskilfully
or improperly built, so as unnecessarily to increase the danger of persons
walking thereon while it is covered with snow and ice, this will render
it defective or insufficient within the meaning of the statute : Id.
Evidence for the defendant city "that there were a great number of
bridges in the city that were built higher than the street, and that
nearly all the approaches of these bridges were raised," was properly rejected as irrelevant to the issue: Id.
NUISANCE.

Change of Condition of Neighborhood.-A business which is useful
and necessary in large communities, and which is not a nuisance of
itself, may become so in view of the circumstances in the neighborhood
in which it is proposed to carry it on : Wier's Appeal, 7.4 Pa.
There is a distinction between a long-established business, which has
become a nuisance in a locality from the increase of population, &c., and
a new erection threatened in such vicinity; carrying on an offensive
trade for any number of years in a place rdmote from buildings and
public roads, does not authorize its continuance there when houses have
been built and roads laid out and it is a nuisance to the occupants ana
travellers, but it requires a much clearer case for the chancellor to
compel the removal of an establishment in which the owner has invested
his capital and carried on business for a long time, than of one to be
established for the first time, against notice that there will be application to equity to prevent it: Mi.
I The legislature has recognised that the storing of gunpowder in large
quantities in thickly settled places is a nuisance to be guarded against
by public authority: Id.
The erection of a powder-house was in this case restrained, without
the existence of actual irreparable damage, but to prevent it: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

See Debtor and Creditor.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

When the Act of 1867 applies.-The Act of Congress of March 2d
1867, undir which a removal may be had of causes from a state to a
Federal court, only authorizes a removal where an application is made
before final judgment in the court of original jurisdiction, where the
suit is brought. It does not authorize a removal after an appeal has
been taken from such judgment of the court of original jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court of the state: Stevenson v. Williams, 19 Wall.
Where the judgment of a state court was annulled by the decree of
a court of the same state, on the ground that the notes on which the
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judgm~mt was rendared were given for a loan of Confederate money,
and that the transactions which resulted in the acquisition of the notes
were had between enemies during the late civil war, in violation of the
proclamation of the President forbidding commercial intercourse with
the enemy. this court cannot review the ruling in these particulars. It
conflicts with no part of the constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States, and presents no Federal question: Id.
Final Trial or Hearing.-Where, after a suit has been properly removed from a state court into the Circuit Court of the United States,
under the Act of March 2d 1867, which allows such removal, in certain
cases specified by it, "at any time before the final hearing or trial of the
suit," the state court still goes on to adjudicate the case, against the
resistance of the party who got the removal, such action on its part is a
usurpation. and the flict that such a party has contested the suit in such
state court, does not, after a judgment against him, on his bringing the
proceedings here for reversal and direction to proceed no further, constitute a waiver on his part, of the question of the jurisdiction of the
state court. to have tried the case: Insurance Company v. Dunn, 19
Wall.
The language above quoted-" at any time before the final hearing
or trial of the suit--of the Act of March 2d 1867, is not of the same
import as the language of the Act of July 27th 1866, on the same general subject-" at any time before the triall or final hearing." On the
contrary, the word "final" in the first-mentioned act, must be taken to
apply to the word "trial" as well as to the word "hearing."
Accordingly, although a removal was made after trial on merits, a verdict,
a motion for a new trial made and refused, and a judgment on the ver-"
dict,.yet it having been so made in a state where by statute the party
could still demand, as of right, a second trial, hed, that such first trial
was not a "final trial" within the meaning of the Act of Congress; the
party seeking to remove the case having demanded and having got leave
to have a second trial under the said statute of the state: Id.
A"

SALE.

Chkange of-Posseson.-Where the transfer of possession of chattels
corresponds with the nature of the property sold and the relation of the
parties, the sale will be valid unless fraudulent
in fact: .Mc'arlan
v.
I
English, 74 Pa.
Where there has been an actual and continued change of possession
the court cannot pronounce the sale fraudulent in law: Id.
The separation of the property from the possession of the vendor
must be at the time of sale or a reasonable time afterwards: and may
be made. by surrendering the power over it to the vendee : Id.
SCHOOL TEACHER.

Right to m'tintain Discipline in School-Expulsion of Scholar.-It
is the duty of a teacher to maintain proper and necessary discipline'in
school; and to that end, a teacher may, when necessary, expel a scholar;
and if the prudential committee insist upon! the return of such scholar
to the school, when his presence would be fatal to the maintenance of
such discipline, the teacher may lawfully quit the school, and recover
his salary: Scott v. School District Aro. 2 in Fairfax, 46 Vt.
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STAMP.

.Mfeaning of Dollars- Costs.-Where the consideration in a deed is
expressed to be so many dollars, the stamp required is the same whether
in point of fact the sum named be paid in gold or in notes of the United
States, made by law a legal tender: Hall v. Jordan, 19 Wall.
A party alleging that the stamp on a deed was too small (he being
by the law of the state where the deed was made obliged to put on
the stamps), who brought such a question here, delaying the judgment
below for two years and a half, punished under the twenty-third rule,
by
Id.a judgment of ten per cent. damages in addition to interest and costs:
STATUTE.

Construction of by Executive ffcers.-The construction given to the
Internal Revenue Act by commissioners of internal revenue, even though
published in an Internal Revenue Record, is not a construction of so
much dignity that a re-enactment of the statute subsequent to the construction having been made and published, is to be regarded as a legislative adoption of that construction; especially not when the construction
made a proviso to an act repugnant to the body of the act : Savings Bank
v. United States, 19 Wall.
Repeal by second Statute on the same Subject.-The repeal of statutes
by implication is not favored. If there be two affirmative statutes on the
same subject, there must be a clear inconsistency or repugnancy, that the
later one may repeal the former: Somerset and Stoystown Road, 74 Pa.
A subsequent affirmative statute is a repeal of a former as to the same
matter, if it introduces a new rule and is intended as a substitute for
the former: Id.
TAXATION.

Divideud-Corporation.-Aprofit upon the capital or investment of
a corporation, either made or passed to the stockholders without declaration of a dividend, or a dividend declared, becomes the measure of the
state tax on dividends: Commonwealth v. P., F. IV and C Railway
Go., 74 Pa.
If a dividend be declared, the stock is taxable on the basis of the declaration ; and the company is estopped by the declaration whether the
dividend be earned or not: Id.
A nominal or arithmetical increase of shares without transferring to
the stockholders anything out of the treasury or property of the corporation, is not a dividend or profit, either made or declared : 11.
A railroad company leased its road to another corporation for nine
hundred and ninety-nine years, at 12 per cent. per annum on its capital;
the first company increased the number of its shares 71 per cent. (the
par value of both the original and increased shares being$.50), on which
the stockholders were to receive 7 per cent. dividend, being the same
amount they would have received on the original number of shares at 12
per cent. Held, that this increase was not subject to state taxation as a
dividend or profits : Id.
.Dividends.-A railroad company was authorized to sell their stock
"to such persons and for such a price and on such terms as they shall
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deem best; the company gave the option to its stockholders "of taking
pro rata for each share the sum of $40 of the capital stock upon the
payment of $4 for each share of stock," and declared a dividend of 7
per cent. per annum, payable quarterly. The increase of stock was
$1,000,000. Held, that this increase was not a stock dividend liable to
state taxation : Commonwealth v. Erie and Pittsbury R. Co., 74 Pa.
It is not a presumption, that an increase of stock authorized by law is
a stock dividend. Whether the increase is real or pretence is a question of fact for the jury : .ld.
TENANT AT WILL.

Tenancy at Will, and from Year to Year-Notice to guit.-The
defendant, by the parol permission of the plaintiff, went into possession
of certain premises as tenant to the plainti f without any agreement as
to the time of holding or the payment of rent, and continued in possession
about fourteen years. He built a barn on the premises, and repaired
the house. The plaintiff tried to settle with him ; but could get nothing
out of him but the repairs, and it would seem, he refused to pay rent.
Held, that after such refusal, he could not claim that by his continued
occupancy, his estate had become enlarged by reason 6f an implied liability to pay reasonable annual rent: Rich v. Bolton, 46 Vt.
Held, also, that said repairs, if made in compensation for the use,
were not a payment of a yearly rent; but, rather, payments in gross, for
the whole occupany: Id.
Held, also, that said tenancy did not ripen into a tenancy from
year to year; because it lacked the essential element of annual rent,
necessary to convert a tenancy at will into a tenancy from year to years:
Id.
A tenant at will is not entitled to six months' notice to quit; but only
to reasonable notice, and such as determines the will of the landlord;
and when emblements are in question, such as will protect the tenant
in his rights : Id.
TORT.
Joint Action-Libel.-In an action for tort against two or more, separate acts not committed with a common purpose or design, and without
concert, will not authorize a joint recovery: Leidriq v. Bucher et al., 74
Pa.
If it be proved that only one was concerned the plaintiff may recover
against him as if he only had been sued: I.
In an action against four for libel, a point was," It is not necessary to
sustain the action to prove a joint engagement in making and publishing
the libel ; all that is required is to (prove) that each or any of defendants is guilty, and the jury can give a verdict against all or any one of
the defendants, or separate verdicts against any two or more of them."
The court denied the point, adding, "you may find against one of the
ield to
defendants, but cannot find separate damages against both."'
be correct: Id.
Defendants who have not conspired together or joined in committing
the wrong should not be joined in the same action : Id.
TOWN.

See Neglgence.
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TRESPASS.

Accpptance of Deed with Knowledge ofprior Grant.-P.and wife, in
1872, conveyed to the town of 0. "all the gravel contained in the first
stratum of gravel" upon a strip of land described by metes and bounds,
part of the N. J, S. E. J of see. 1, in said town. In 1873 they conveyed
to plaintiff, by warranty deed, "all of the N. J, S. E. I of sec. 1, which
has not been conveyed to other persons by the grantors." Afterwards,
P. and the other defendants, under the direction of the town supervisors and overseers of highways, entered upon said first-mentioned strip
of land and removed gravel, &e., therefrom, to be used in improving
the highways. In an'action against them for trespass in so doing, field,
That upon the facts shown by the evidence (as to plaintiff's residence
in the neighborhood, his familiarity with the use made of the gravel pit
by the town before his purchase, the fact that said strip of land was enclosed by a fence so as to be out of the possession of P., and in that of
the town, &c.), plaintiff is chargeable with knowledge of the existence
of the deed of the gravel pit from his grantors to the town : Quinlan v.
Pierce and others, 34 Wis.
Evience-Sel-Defince-Exemplary Damages.-Under the circumstances of this case, it was held not error for the county court to admit
evidence of the pendency of certain suits in favor of the defendant
against the plaintiff, growing out of the same controversy which led to the
assault, for the purpose of showing the animus of the defendant towards
the plaintiff: Edwards v. Leavitt, 46 Vt.
The amount and extent of force that one has a right to use in selfdefence, depends, in some measure, on the perilous condition he has
reason to suppose himself in from apprehended violence from his assailant, and what force he has reason to suppose necessary to protect
himself. Hence, in an affray between the plaintiff and the defendant,
where it was known to both that two hired men of the defendant were
near by, it was held proper for .the jury to consider that fact, as bearing
on the question of how much force the defendant had a right to use,
under the circumstances, in self-defence : Id.
It has long been settled in this state, that in actions of trespass for
assault and battery, the jury may give exemplary damages. And the
pendency of a criminal prosecution for the same act, is no bar to the recovery of such damages : Id.
UsuRY. See Confederate Notes.
Representations by Agent-Estoppel- Wife as Witness.-Where an
agent employed by and acting for the borrower only, negotiates a loan
for the highest legal rate of interest, and, without, the knowledge or cinsent of the lender, retains a fee for his services, this does not wake the
loan usurious: Sage v. Wright, 34 Wis.
Plaintiff bought a note and mortgage without knowledge of any fict
making them usurious, and afterward negotiated with the authorized
agent of thg borrower, in reference thereto, and such agent represented
that the debt for which said note and mortgage were given, "was an
honest debt and would be paid." On the faith of these rep-esentations
plaintiff bought another note made by said borrower and secured by
mortgage of the same land, and extended the time of payment of both
notes. Held, that the borrower was bound by the representations of his
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agent and was estopped from setting up the defence of usury to the first
mentioned note and mortgage. Id.
A wife being empowered by our statute to sell and transfer to her
husband a note and mortgage which are her separate property, " with
like effect as if she were unmarried" (Tay. Stats., 1195, § 2), she
must be held a competent witness for her husband to show that such
note and mortgage are free from usury; such right in the vendor being
an element in the value of the security, and necessary to protect her
from liability to refund the consideration : Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Rescission for Faudulent Representations-Inspection by Purchaser.
after reading certain representations of the character of B.'s
-A.,
farm, made by B. in a letter to his city !agent for the sale of the
property, visits the farm in person, but, on account of the depth of
snow, cannot determine for himself the truth of B.'s representations,
which are then and there repeated, in regard to the nature of the soil,
the practicability of mowing the meadow land, &c.; and he purchases
on the faith of such representations, which arb fraudulent and false,
paying a very much larger price than the !farm is worth. Held, that.
Uity will rescind the contract: Risch v. Von Lilienthal and Wife, 31
The fact that A. visited the land before purchasing is not conclusive,
under the circumstances of the case, that he did not finally purchase
on the faith of B.'s said representations; especially as such visit was
necessary to enable him to ascertain other facts relative to the situation
of the-farm, not included in such representations : Id.
Mere ianadeguacy of considerationis not of itself sufficient ground for
rescinding a contract; but gross inadequacy of consideration may be of
decisive weight in determining the question of frqud: Id.
WILL.
Codicil- Conditional Revocaton.-A testator made a will dated
November 20th 1871; he made another dated January 13th 1873 ; he
made a "codicil to my last will and testament," dated " this - day of
January 1873." By the codicil, after refering to the law relating to
bequests to charities, he provided, "Now I declare said will of 20th
November 1871 to be my last will should I die before the st of March
1873, otherwise the will of 13th January 1873 shall be my last will."
He died on the 28d of January 1873. Hed, that the paper of November 1871 was his will: Hamilton's Estate, 74 Pa.
The paper of January 13th 1873 was not his will, the contingency
on which it was to become so never having happened; and it did not
therefore revoke the will of 1871: Id.
The codicil and the will of 1873 are to be construed as one instrnment: Id.
The will of 1871 spoke from its date, and the charitable bequeste
were not avoided under the Act of April 26th 1855 : Id.
WITNESS.

See Usury.

